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Putin’s United Russia will win – but vote tally, turnout and level of coercion will tell the real story of Russia’s wartime elections
Putin’s United Russia will win – but vote tally, turnout and level of coercion will tell the real story of Russia’s wartime elections. Originally published by The Conversation.
By Regina Smyth, Professor of Political Science, Indiana University · 2026-09-16T23:20:12.697Z
Russia’s parliamentary elections https://www.reuters.com/world/what know about russias upcoming parliamentary election 2026 09 15/ will take place on Sept. 18 20, 2026, amid the ongoing war with Ukraine. Given the backdrop of an energy crisis https://www.cnbc.com/2026/06/29/putin russia fuel shortages ukraine drone strikes.html , battlefield failures https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/ukrainian battlefield gains expose russias communications problems/ in Ukraine and fears of more national conscription https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/05/world/europe/russia war mobilization draft.html at home, you might think that the Kremlin should have reason for concern. Yet few observers believe the result is in doubt: Russian President Vladimir Putin’s United Russia party will undoubtedly win. Anything less will demonstrate societal disloyalty to the government and opposition to the Ukraine War. And the Kremlin will not allow that. In 2020, I wrote a book https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/elections protest and authoritarian regime stability/51A474C37A1671C885CC5F90091EDBC0 that demonstrated how the Kremlin does not have to engage in massive vote fraud to win a parliamentary majority. Russia’s election managers have consistently used coercive tactics and pressured business and bureaucratic managers https://global.oup.com/academic/product/workplace politics 9780197802014?cc=us&lang=en& to ensure workers support the government. To me, the real indicators of public support for the government are the vote margin for Putin’s party and the extent to which the Kremlin places its thumb on the scale to maintain its party’s two thirds majority of parliamentary seats. The Kremlin’s tall order Russians are no doubt entering the vote feeling gloomy about the country’s prospects. A war in Ukraine meant to last only days https://www.npr.org/2026/02/24/nx s1 5721139/russia ukraine war has dragged on for years and is increasing costs on Russian civilians. Ukrainian drone attacks have targeted Russian energy https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia hits petrol station warehouse facilities kyiv mayor says 2026 09 15/ and retail infrastructure https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/clyxlm877p2o ; casualty figures are far higher than thought possible https://www.cnn.com/2026/01/28/europe/russia ukraine casualties csis report intl hnk ml at the beginning of the conflict; inflation is rising https://tradingeconomics.com/russia/inflation cpi ; and in many regions, unemployment is also increasing https://ua.news/en/world/u moskvi ta velikikh regionakh rosiyi rizko zrosla kilkist bezrobitnikh .
Lines of cars form outside a gas station in St. Petersburg on Sept. 15, 2026, amid acute fuel shortages. Timur Kasumov/Anadolu via Getty Images United Russia’s popularity has been hovering around 32% https://novayagazeta.eu/en/articles/2026/07/24/ruling united russia party s approval rating hits lowest level since start of full scale war en news in public opinion polls. It is the lowest figure since the full invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. And even then, the number is likely inflated by respondents’ fear of revealing their opposition. Over the course of 20 years, the Kremlin developed an arsenal of tools to manage elections out of view of voters. For example, it has relied in the past on gerrymandering districts https://meduza.io/en/feature/2026/06/02/gerrymandering a la russe to preserve united russia s supermajority the kremlin is pressuring communists to sideline their strongest candidates in september s elections , redrawing urban districts to look like flower petals in order to incorporate aging voters in small towns and rural areas who tend to be more supportive of the regime. But in this election, unlike in the past, the Kremlin has not offered financial incentives to these groups. In addition, casualties are disproportionately concentrated in rural areas, and the lack of fuel is impeding the harvest. The Kremlin can invariably find ways for its loyalists to vote, but it must overcome these hurdles to reach the threshold required for United Russia to manufacture and retain a constitutional parliamentary majority. Controlling the vote Fortunately for the Kremlin, there are opportunities to falsify the elections without leaving telltale signs that might provoke postelection protests. The election will be held over three days https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2026/07/02/russia is gearing up for nationwide elections this is what you need to know a93142 , allowing officials to monitor vote counts and adjust them over the voting period. The fact that many voters will vote online will also help hide any manipulation https://russian election monitor.org/big brother of russian elections/ from public view. These are not unreasonable electoral concerns. Both statistical analyses https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC3545790/ and reports by Russian https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2024/03/18/russian presidential vote an imitation election watchdog golos says a84511 and European https://odihr.osce.org/odihr/elections/383577 election observers have identified significant fraud in past elections. In this round of voting, there will be few independent observers. The election watchdog GOLOS, or “Vote,” was disbanded https://www.dw.com/en/russia independent golos election watchdog disbands/a 73232343 in the face of Kremlin pressures, and European monitors were not invited https://odihr.osce.org/odihr/667020 to observe this election. Most importantly, the Kremlin controls who can compete in elections. Since the early 2000s, it has created an artificial party system https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/17/world/europe/russia elections interference.html , adding parties to give the illusion of competition. In addition to Putin’s party, United Russia, the system includes 18 other parties. Of these, only 10 will be on the ballot – and all have been handpicked by the Kremlin because they will not challenge the government with opposition legislation or open criticism. Most are there to give the pretense of competition and absorb opposition votes, but they will not get enough support to be seated in the Parliament. In addition to electoral controls, repression and disinformation have eliminated nonpartisan organized opposition. The Kremlin’s dismantling of opposition figure Alexei Navalny’s https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw commentary/2024 02 19/chronicle a death foretold putin gets rid navalny Anti Corruption Foundation illustrates its power. Founded months before postelection protests in 2011 https://www.bbc.com/news/world europe 16122524 , the Anti Corruption Foundation https://fbk.info/en built a national organization to mount electoral challenges, and it linked elections and voting to popular protest to give voice to opposition. But in 2021, the Kremlin declared the foundation an “ extremist” organization https://www.nytimes.com/2025/11/27/world/europe/russia navalny terrorist.html ; it now operates in exile. Navalny died in prison in 2024 – his supporters and outside bodies insist he was murdered https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cwyk4lz4e3eo – and most of its regional leaders have also been jailed. The Yabloko surprise Given its history of suppressing authentic opposition, the Kremlin controlled Central Election Commission’s July 2026 decision to allow https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2026/07/29/election commission clears yabloko to run pro peace candidates in state duma races a93367 one independent, anti war opposition party, Yabloko, to compete came as a surprise. At the time, only 3% of Russians supported the party, perhaps leading the Kremlin to conclude that including it on the ballot was a safe choice https://www.rferl.org/a/russia political party yabloko disqualifying/33826730.html . But despite its relatively small following, Yabloko – as the only anti war party https://www.nytimes.com/2026/08/17/world/europe/russia yabloko party election.html among those initially approved to compete – could have served as a barometer of antipathy toward Russia’s conduct of its war in Ukraine. As such, its role in the election was short lived, and the Central Election Commission soon reversed its decision https://meduza.io/en/news/2026/08/18/russia s central election commission removes anti war yabloko party from the ballot the ballot now jumps from no 1 united russia to no 3 ldpr . Yabloko lost a subsequent Supreme Court appeal, and its second in command, Lev Shlosberg https://www.dw.com/en/russia prison for opposition leader over war criticism/a 78403203 , was sentenced to 11 years in jail for a crime commonly called “fakes against the military.” Whether Yabloko’s registration was a trial balloon or an abandoned ruse https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2026/0819/russia yabloko ukraine war wildberries drone strikes?utm term=Autofeed&utm medium=Social&cmpid=FB&utm source=Facebook Echobox=1787177450 to validate the election, its elimination means that there is now no anti war party on the ballot. Spoiled ballots, disengaged voters Given the control that the Kremlin has over all stages of the election process, outside observers may question why the Kremlin would be so concerned about what looks to be a sure bet election. The danger for the Kremlin isn’t so much about the result, but that discussions about how to vote will spark a new shared sense of growing opposition among Russians. Navalny taught Russians to use their vote as a protest https://fbk.info/en/campaigns/againstur within the controlled environment. During the 2011 2012 protests in Russia, he instructed voters to choose “ anyone but United Russia https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/dec/07/vladimir putin russia election editorial .” Several years later, he developed a “ Smart Vote https://ridl.io/how smart is smart voting/ ” app to coordinate voting on acceptable approved opposition candidates. The idea wasn’t to oust United Russia, but to undermine it.
A makeshift memorial for late Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny in Berlin on Feb. 17, 2026. Ralf Hirschberger/AFP via Getty Images Now working in exile, the Anti Corruption Foundation is planning to use a modified version of Smart Vote to enable protest voting. Some voters will follow these instructions, while others will write in “Yabloko” or spoil their ballots to express opposition. While many Russians are disengaged from politics because they feel powerless, they may engage in protest voting if they think that their action will matter to change the state’s policies. The potential for visible dissent has reportedly forced the Kremlin to lower its expectations https://meduza.io/en/feature/2026/07/23/as support for putin slips the kremlin lowers the ruling party s election target amid fears a landslide victory would look suspicious over how many Russians will turn out to vote for United Russia. And while almost no analyst https://www.theatlantic.com/international/2026/08/russia ukraine drone war protest/688259/ is predicting anything other than a United Russia win, a lower turnout or an underwhelming winning margin for the party will be taken by Russians to be a clear signal of the true state of support for the war — and discontent with the government.
Regina Smyth does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.